How did the Berlin Blockade impact the Cold War? It stopped the reunification of Germany under pro-American government. It allowed the Soviet Union to retain control over most of Eastern Europe. It convinced the United States that it must stand firm against communist expansion. It prevented the Soviet Union from placing missiles within striking range of Western Europe.
@BulletWithButterflyWings Do you know this answer?
Lol, im taking mine too. Long af
Right? It's super hard and NO ONE will help me AT ALL. Some do, but they give me links and pretty much every website on this computer is blocked except for this one and my FLVS site.
Lol yeah. you re on a school computer ?
No. I'm on a home computer. I do online school.
Um... come to conclusions. Which do you KNOW is not the answer?
I'm not sure, I don't think I read this in my lesson at all and I can't look it up.
Oh lordy. I don't really know :/ Help will come soon!
I ll find it. Give me a minute tho
I really hope so, because I have orientation for school at 5.
@FilthyMcNasty Thank you.
Here is what i found: The city of Berlin, another location of unrest during Kennedy's presidency, had been divided into Western and Soviet zones of occupation since the end of World War II. West Berlin was a free city surrounded by an East Germany dominated by the Soviets. Many East Germans, however, used West Berlin as a transit point to get into West Germany. There they could gain political freedom. On August 13, 1961, the East German government responded to this growing problem. They built a concrete wall guarded by armed soldiers to seal off West Berlin. Kennedy acted by reinforcing the U.S. troops in West Berlin and calling up military reserves. The Berlin Wall, and Kennedy's response, represented another Cold War standoff. In June 1963, Kennedy traveled to the wall and made a stirring speech pledging continued support for West Germany.
I believe it s C
According to what you've found?
yes, thats from the lesson. What do you think ?
Definitely not B or D.
Before, I was thinking that it might be A. But I just don't know.
Pretty much every website on this computer is blocked except for this one and my FLVS site. So I can't see anything that isn't on this site or my school website.
Many different things came from the Berlin Airlift. One of the biggest was "...after the collapse of the Blockade, two separate German states came into being. Since there was no prospect of the Russians allowing a united and ‘free’ Germany to be created, the western powers went ahead alone and set up the Federal Republic of Germany. The Russians replied by establishing their own German state, the German Democratic Republic". "The Blockade certainly resulted in the final collapse of the wartime alliance and cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union"(Gcsehistory.org.uk). After the Soviets blockaded Berlin, there was no chance for the Soviets to cooperate and create one German state. So two separate states were created because the alliance was broken. "In many ways the most important consequence of the Blockade...the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. The Blockade had demonstrated the West’s military unreadiness and frightened them into making definite preparations. Already in March 1948 Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg had signed the Brussels Defence Treaty promising military collaboration in the event of war. Now they were joined by the USA, Canada, Portugal, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Norway. All signed the North Atlantic Treaty, agreeing to regard an attack on one of them as an attack on them all and placing their defence forces under a joint NATO command structure"(Gcsehistory.org.uk). The airlift also helped the United States's popularity around the world. "It was the turning point in the German people’s attitudes toward democracy, which had been unpopular. And it was the moment when the United States first learned how to function at the summit of world power and became admired and beloved around the world"(Cherny, Andrei). Picture "When I was over there [Berlin] in 2008 at one of the ceremonies at the old Templehof Airfield which was attended by about 100,000 people, I was surrounded by them asking for my autograph. I must have signed at least 500 pieces of paper, programs, or anything I could write on for them. It is quite an emotional feeling, when actually we were all just doing our jobs, not realizing at the time the impact we had on the entire World. We prevented the Soviets from taking, Berlin, Germany, and possibly all of Europe." -Lewis Dale Whipple, Berlin Airlift Veteran "This was the Berlin Airlift. This was a major military confrontation lasting over a year that resulted in resounding victory without a shot being fired." -Lt. Col. Harold W. Watson, Berlin Airlift Veteran "The Airlift was the first battle of the Cold War and Prevented a third World War and kept Europe from going all Communist." -W.C. (Dub) Southers, Berlin Airlift Veteran "We stopped the Communist from taking over Germany and all of Europe!!!!" -Dr. Earl Moore, Berlin Airlift Veteran Picture In many way, the Berlin Airlift is what stopped Stalin from spreading Communism through the rest of Germany, and Europe. "Halvorsen says the Berlin Airlift stopped Soviet leader Josef Stalin from marching westward. 'He had to take West Berlin before he went to west Germany. He got stopped in West Berlin by world opinion because he was starving people, and the British, French, and Americans were feeding them'"(Voices of America). The following is an excerpt from my personal interview with Gail Halvorsen. "What do you think the greatest achievement made by the United States was during the Berlin Airlift? Stopped Stalin from taking West Berlin and West Germany"(Halvorsen, Gail). In another interview with Bill Anderson, he agreed. "What do you think the greatest achievement made by the United States was during the Berlin Airlift? 'Stopping the spread of Communism throughout Europe...'"(Anderson, Bill). Guy Dunn also agreed. "What do you think the greatest achievement made by the United States was during the Berlin Airlift? Stopping the spread of Communism throughout Europe"(Dunn, Guy). The Airlift also showed the Soviets how powerful we were. "Neither can one exaggerate the value of the Berlin Airlift as a tool to impress the Soviet Union...The size and extent of the airlift, the requirement for close coordination, and the resourcefulness of allied leadership all impressed the Soviet leadership"(Launius, Roger D.). It showed the Soviets that we weren't going to give up without a fight, we were going to "Contain" them. Mr. George Gols said the following in a personal interview. "What do you think was the biggest impact the Berlin Airlift had on Berlin and Germany for the rest of the Cold War? It showed the Soviets we wouldn't give up, and that Americans cared as humanitarians for children and civilians in Berlin"(Gols, George). The Berlin Airlift stopped Josef Stalin's spread of Communism through Germany and the rest of Europe.
Can you see it now?
Yes.
So it IS C?
Yes
Did I help?
Yep. Thank you guys. Can you help me with a couple more questions please?
I will try. Please give me a medal if I was helpful.
Which statement explains the connection between the Civil Rights movement and the antiwar movement? Civil Rights leaders began to oppose the Vietnam War because of racial disparities in the draft. Civil Rights leaders began adopting some of the radical methods that proved successful in the antiwar movement. Civil Rights activists often relied on antiwar protestors to show that their movement included significant white support. Civil Rights activists often joined antiwar protests because they felt that any anti-government action was worth supporting.
What do you think is the answer?
I think that A is the answer. It just seems to me like it would be the most logical choice.
Simon Hall. Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. 267 Seiten. $45.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8122-3839-6. Reviewed by Brian Daugherity (Department of History, College of William and Mary) Published on H-South (June, 2006) Make Love, Not War: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements of the 1960s Simon Hall's Peace and Freedom examines the relationship between the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam War movement of the 1960s. Addressing the question of why these two movements did not work more closely together, Hall postulates that differences in how African Americans and peace activists viewed the war, the racial tensions reflected in Black Power, and factionalism within the peace movement precluded a meaningful and potentially beneficial relationship. Hall begins by explaining how the various civil rights organizations responded to the Vietnam War. He argues that the organizing experiences of SNCC and CORE, which focused on the intransigent Deep South in the early 1960s, radicalized their members and led them to denounce the war more quickly than other civil rights organizations. Hall credits the year 1964, especially Freedom Summer and the Democratic Party's Atlantic City convention, with changing the mindsets of activists associated with these organizations. He correctly notes growing frustration within SNCC and CORE during this period--with the FBI, the Johnson Administration and Democratic Party, and the federal government more broadly. Hall argues that this disillusionment encouraged these organizations to be more critical of federal government policy--domestic and foreign. When American involvement in Vietnam grew, then, SNCC became the first major civil rights organization to denounce the war, followed quickly by CORE. Hall argues that other civil rights organizations, including the NAACP and National Urban League, were less inclined to publicly oppose the war because of their stronger belief in the beneficence of the federal government. While SNCC and CORE were willing to break with President Johnson and suffer significant consequences for doing so, more "moderate" organizations sought "the difficult balance that national civil rights leaders sometimes had to strike between principle and pragmatism" (p. 66). Choosing to focus their efforts and energies on civil rights issues, the NAACP and Urban League remained virtually silent--except for occasionally disparaging remarks aimed at antiwar civil rights activists--until the political and war climate changed at the end of the decade. After discussing the reactions of these civil rights organizations to the war, Hall examines the relationship between civil rights organizations and the peace movement. He concludes that, despite significant attempts by peace activists to reach out to African Americans and occasional signs of cooperation, black Americans generally did not become active supporters of the antiwar movement. Early efforts at cooperation, including the Assembly of Unrepresented People (AUP) and National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC), went poorly. Racial tensions existed between black and white activists--somewhat akin to the well-known problems of the 1964 and 1965 Freedom Summer campaigns--and Hall points out that at the AUP "there was a tendency for peace and civil rights activists to meet separately" (p. 33). At the NCC convention in November 1965, civil rights activists bemoaned the intellectual nature and tedious debate of the peace activists, and many civil rights delegates eventually left early. Clearly in 1965 there were two separate movements for change, one focused on domestic racism and the other on America's growing involvement in Vietnam. Over time, black opposition to the war in Vietnam grew, and the possibility for cooperation between the peace and civil rights movements improved. Hall notes signs of collaboration--particularly in early 1967--which fueled the hope that inter-movement cooperation might strengthen their respective efforts. The possibility of such collaboration, however, faded quickly, and the involvement of civil rights organizations in antiwar activism declined. Hall explains, "by the end of the year [1967], the two movements seemed as far apart as ever" (p. 107). Some of the reasons behind the inability of the antiwar and civil rights movements to work together dated back to the mid-1960s. These included the fact that the antiwar movement was overwhelmingly white, college-based, and prone to intellectualism. Although black activists increasingly opposed the war itself--particularly because of the draft--an oppositional stance did not automatically lead to involvement in antiwar activities. Black opposition to the war, moreover, was often based on different reasons than those of white antiwar activists. Blacks linked the war with Western colonialism and racism more quickly than whites, and were also more likely to be concerned with the racially biased draft system. African Americans also expressed concern about the mounting costs of the war and how the financial investment overseas would impact domestic spending and President Johnson's Great Society programs--many of which sought to improve the status of African Americans. As Hall explains, "black radicals opposed the Vietnam War for different reasons from those of the white movement" (p. 144). By 1966, moreover, feelings of black nationalism and racial solidarity pervaded the civil rights movement, particularly the organizations which had already come out against the war and which were therefore most inclined to cooperate with the peace movement. Advocates of Black Power worried about being co-opted by the predominantly white peace movement and sought, if anything, separate black antiwar organizations. As these civil rights organizations expelled their white members, it became clear that their ability to cooperate with predominantly white antiwar organizations was in jeopardy. This was not lost on the expelled whites, many of whom went on to become active in the antiwar movement. At the same time, growing racial violence in America's cities concerned peace activists and highlighted the chasm between advocates for racial change and those fighting against the war in Vietnam. Hall concludes, "arguments about emphasis and multi-issuism, the cultural and 'intellectual' barriers between white students and antiwar activists and black civil rights workers, and interracial tensions, would, throughout the decade, plague efforts to build a broad, radical, multiracial, multi-issue antiwar coalition" (p. 33). Peace and Freedom is organized in six chapters, roughly following the chronology outlined above, with an introduction and a conclusion. Its balanced coverage of both civil rights and antiwar activism allows the reader to learn a good amount about both movements. Hall also tells the story through a variety of different perspectives, from those of the national civil rights organizations to grassroots activists in Virginia and Cairo, Illinois. His ability to move between these geographically diverse locales strengthens his overarching points about the relationship between the two movements. The arguments in Peace and Freedom are well supported by archival and secondary research, and Hall's knowledge of the two movements is impressive. Importantly, he points out where his argument differs from that of previous scholars, whether with regard to civil rights or antiwar activities. Doing so with a balanced tone, and acknowledging the importance of all previous scholarship, greatly adds to the book's maturity and readability. At times, Hall's use of countless quotations makes for laborious reading, but on the other hand this shows careful organization and provides a more direct and personal connection to the era he is discussing. To the extent that Hall seeks to explain why the civil rights and antiwar movements were unable to work together more carefully, he has succeeded. Peace and Freedom does, however, raise questions for future scholarship. Among civil rights historians, the book will leave some wondering if Hall's explanations of the civil rights organizations' positions on the war are so clear-cut. Many African Americans, of course, came out against the war--some quite early--despite never having been involved in anything resembling the SNCC/CORE "organizing experience" of the Deep South. At the same time, as Hall explains, a number of members of both SNCC and CORE opposed coming out against the war, despite the fact that they were involved in the same organizing experience as their colleagues. More in-depth examinations of the personalities involved can shed additional light on the decision-making process, both individually and collectively. With regard to SNCC and CORE, additional scholarship may also help explain how the shift toward Black Power--and power struggles within these organizations--helped bring about their public opposition to the war. It is also important to recognize that African Americans as a group generally were not as concerned with America's involvement in Vietnam as they were with civil rights issues. Certainly this helps to explain the lack of black involvement in the antiwar movement, but it also helps to explain why more "moderate" civil rights organizations chose not to oppose the war earlier. When SNCC came out against the war in 1966, as Hall notes, many blacks considered this a mistake, and undoubtedly other organizations and their leaders noted the reaction.
Can you summarize that a little bit, please?
What do you think the answer is?
I'm not 100% sure, I am thinking A or b.
I'm going with A.
Why did the passing of atomic secrets to the Soviet Union by the Rosenbergs represent a significant threat to the United States? It meant that the Soviet Union would be able to make a direct nuclear attack on the U.S. mainland. It meant that the Soviet Union would be able to develop defenses to stop U.S. nuclear attacks on Soviet territory. It meant that the United States would no longer be the only nation on earth with control over atomic weapons. It meant that the United States and the Soviet Union would be likely to exchange atomic bomb attacks in the Korean War.
What do you think?
I think it's A.
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