Question

During the Cold War, which policy did the United States and the Soviet Union hope would prevent either country from using nuclear weapons against the other?
A. the Eisenhower Doctrine
B. brinkmanship
C. mutual disarmament
D. mutual assured destruction

Answer 1

Brinkmanship (often misused as brinksmanship) is the practice of pushing dangerous events to the verge of—or to the brink of—disaster in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. It occurs in international politics, foreign policy, labour relations, and (in contemporary settings) military strategy involving the threatened use of nuclear weapons.
This maneuver of pushing a situation with the opponent to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions. This might be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers by creating the impression that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear force was often used as such an escalating measure. Adolf Hitler also used brinkmanship conspicuously during his rise to power.

(source: Wikipedia)

Answer 2

D. Although MAD wasn't exactly a formal policy, but rather the interpretation of journalists and historians of events and behaviour. Both sides regarded their nuclear weapons as a deterrence to aggression by the other side. What changes mutual expectations of deterrence into MAD is the idea that both sides have an interest in preventing the development of *defensive* weaponry -- things that could mitigate or even fully protect against a nuclear attack.

The idea is that if you develop some kind of shield against nuclear weapons, even a partial one, you make the other side anxious that its deterrent will not be as useful once the defensive weapon is deployed and ready. That, in turn, makes it more likely that the other side will face a "use it or lose it" situation, in which their motivation for a pre-emptive strike, or at least a "launch on warning" strike, is higher. That is destabilizing, since a war could start more or less by accident, without either side fully intending a full commitment, because of the press of events and the shortness of time available for consultation and consideration.

This led to the ratification of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty of 1972, in which the US and USSR agreed to forgo development of short-range fast missiles that would target ballistic missiles on re-entry, destroying them. (Each side was allowed to keep one existing system, but no others were to be developed or deployed.) It also led to a considerable controversy when MIRV (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle) missiles were developed, like the Minuteman III and particularly the Peacekeeper or MX. The former had 3, and the latter 10, warheads, which could each be targeted to a different impact point. (They were carried on a small rocket-powered "bus" that could adjust trajectories while the missile head was outside the atmosphere.)

MIRVed missiles were considered highly destabilizing, because one side could seriously leverage its warheads in a pre-emptive strike: each warhead of a Soviet attack, for example, could destroy 10 warheads on an American MX missile site, if it were successful. That would give the Americans a very strong reason to launch the MX missile before a Soviet missile landed, even if they just had a warning or suspicion of a Soviet attack. MIRVed missiles were banned by the START II treaty, negotiated by President George Bush, Sr. and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1993.